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Abstract:  
This paper aims to revisit the link between corporate governance, value, and firm 
performance by focusing on convergence, understood as the way that non-US firms 
are adopting US best practice in terms of corporate governance, and the implications 
of this adoption. We examine theoretical questions related to conventional models 
(agency theory, transaction cost economics, new property rights theory),which tend to 
suggest rational adoption of best practice, and contributions that alternatively consider 
country- and firm-level differences as possible barriers to convergence. We contribute 
to the empirical literature by using a large international database to show how non-US 
firms’ adoption of US best practice is having an impact on performance. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance; governance metrics, ratings, rankings and scoring; 
firm value; firm performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the US, corporate governance started to become important for market practitioners 
in the early 1990s. Today, it is a topic of discussion worldwide. International investors 
generally regard corporate governance as an important criterion in their investment 
decisions. According to Global Investor Opinion Survey (McKinsey, 2002), 15% of 
European institutional investors consider corporate governance to be more important 
than financial issues such as profit performance or growth potential. Also, 22% of 
European institutional investors are willing to pay a premium of 19% on average for a 
well-governed company. More and more countries are tightening the rules and 
regulation related to governance by adopting new standards inspired largely by US 
codes of best practice and establishing guidelines for publicly listed companies to try 
to improve the overall governance of firms. The OECD (2004) Principles of 
Corporate Governance acknowledge that an effective corporate governance system 
can lower the cost of capital and encourage firms to use resources more efficiently, 
thereby promoting growth. These factors implicitly and explicitly support the belief 
that better corporate governance will result in higher firm value and more profitable 
firm performance.  
 
However, some commentators insist on the importance of the institutional context in 
which the governance system operates and do not support the idea of convergence 
towards the US model. They point to a growing co-existence of distinct national 
models of corporate governance with the US style governance. Up to the mid 1990s, 
most work on corporate governance was in the context of US firms. However the 
influential work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2002) has 
stimulated a large body of work on international comparisons (Levine, 2005; La Porta 
et al., 2008). Much of this work focuses on differences between countries’ legal 
systems, and studies how these differences relate to differences in the way that 
economies and capital markets perform.  
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While research on comparative corporate governance so far has focused mainly on 
cross-country differences in governance, a substantial body of research on US firms 
shows that cross-firm differences related to governance have substantial effects on 
firm value and performance (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2008; Core et al., 
2006). Much less documented is how non-US firms that adopt US best practice are 
performing. This paper addresses this issue at the theoretical and empirical levels. 
 
At the theoretical level, agency theory identifies several reasons why good corporate 
governance increases firm value and performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Basically, good governance involves better monitoring, greater transparency and 
public disclosure between principal (investor) and agent (manager). This leads to 
increased investor trust and a decrease in managers’ discretion and expropriation of 
rents. Well-governed firms are supposed to be less risky, and to have more efficient 
operations and reduced auditing and monitoring costs. These elements tend to 
alleviate the cost of capital and generate higher expected cash flow stream, which, in 
turn, create higher firm valuation and better performance. However, agency theory is 
based on a well-known set of strict hypotheses which largely neglect the institutional 
context in which the corporate governance system operates. Thus, it provides a 
theoretical background to the rational adoption of best practice by firms (US and 
non-US) irrespective of country-or firm-level differences. This is leading to potential 
inconclusive results. This paper tries to investigate this area more finely. 
 
At the empirical level many strands of work, including studies of some aspects of 
corporate governance (e.g. board composition, shareholder rights, executive 
remuneration, insider ownership, takeover defences, see Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998), single country analyses (especially the US, see Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk 
et al., 2008; Core et al., 2006; but also Russia, see Black, 2001 and Black et al., 2006a; 
Korea, see Black et al., 2006b; Germany, see Drobetz et al., 2004; and Switzerland, 
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see Beiner et al., 2006) and cross sectional analyses(e.g. Drobetz et al., 2004, which 
uses data from a single year), are providing increasing evidence that US corporate 
governance leads to higher value and performances in both US and non-US firms. 
This is supporting the hypotheses of Agency theory and other conventional models. 
However, we need more robust econometric analysis of corporate governance for the 
value and performance of firms. This paper provides empirical results based on data 
from the largest corporate governance data provider, RiskMetrics/Institutional 
Shareholder Services. Its data have at least three advantages. First, it is the most 
extensive database in terms of coverage (number of firms, length of time frame) able 
to generate robust and generalizable quantitative results. Second, it is based on 55 
governance factors spanning 8 categories of corporate governance including board of 
directors, audit committee, charter/bylaws, antitakeover provisions, compensation, 
progressive practices, ownership, and director’s education. Third, it explicitly 
considers non-US data, allowing more systematic analysis than has been done so far. 
We find that claims of convergence, in the sense of the adoption of US best practice 
by non-US firms, are supported by an economically important and statistically strong 
correlation between governance, value and performance of these firms. Convergence 
generates higher performance. However, in our view this should not be the end to 
discussion on corporate governance. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related theoretical and 
empirical research and formulates our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our corporate 
governance data and summarizes the firm-level value and performance variables. 
Section 4 reports on the relation between corporate governance measures, stock 
market performance, Tobin’s Q, and operating performance (ROA, NPM). Section 5 
concludes. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses  
 
2.1. Theory 
 
From a theoretical point of view, corporate governance issues arise due to the 
separation of ownership and management. Principal-agent theory is the starting point 
of most discussions of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Agency 
problems can affect firm value and performance via expected cash flows for investors, 
and the cost of capital. First, agency problems make investors pessimistic about future 
cash flows being diverted. Good governance increases investor trust and willingness 
to pay more and renders managers’ actions costly and expropriation less likely. Good 
governance means that ‘more of the firm’s profit would come back to (the investors) 
as interest or dividends as opposed to being expropriated by the entrepreneur who 
controls the firm’ (La Porta et al. 2002, p. 1147). Risk and expected return are 
negatively related since riskier stocks have to be compensated by a higher expected 
rate of return which involves higher costs related to monitoring. Thus investors 
perceive well-governed firms as less risky and better monitored and tend to apply 
lower expected rates of return, which leads to a higher firm valuation. Also, as Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) showed, better governed firms may have more efficient 
operations, resulting in higher expected future cash-flow streams.  
 
Second, the cost of capital is negatively related to measures for protection of 
shareholder rights, and is positively related to general measures of the quality of the 
legal institutions (La Porta et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 2003). In this case, good 
governance will decrease the cost of capital since it reduces shareholder’s monitoring 
and auditing costs (Drobetz et al. 2004; Lombardo and Pagano, 2000; Errunza and 
Miller, 2000). Therefore, better corporate governance structure and practice lead to 
better corporate performance, lower agency costs, and higher stock performance. 
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At the firmlevel of analysis, the division between financing (risk-taking) and 
managing (controlling) functions leads to conflicts (principal-agent problems) 
between managers (agent) and shareholders or investors (principal). The problem 
essentially is to persuade the agent to behave fairly and to act on behalf of the 
principal, and to avoid any discretionary behaviour. The solution to this agency 
problem is to hire managers on highly contingent, long term incentive contracts ex 
ante in order to align their interests with those of their investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). This formalization, which is based on the complete contract hypothesis, 
provides the essential requirements of corporate governance oriented to shareholder 
value, in a context of transparency on contractual relations in organizations. These 
models have three implications:  
(i) they need strong hypotheses in terms of rationality, based on common knowledge 
requirements: the principal knows that, according to an optimal remuneration scheme, 
he can access information hidden by the agent. At the same time, the agent knows that 
he must deliver his private information to the principal on agreeing to an optimal 
remuneration contract; 
(ii) they reduce organization problems to simple incentive misalignment problems: 
internal organization and business strategies are analysed primarily with respect to the 
elimination of information asymmetries between principals and agents; 
(iii) they focus exclusively on the control exerted by the discretionary power of 
managers: managers generally have private information that promotes manipulative 
and opportunistic behaviours.  
 
Complementary approaches have been developed in relation to transaction costs 
(Williamson 1988, 2000), and property rights (Hart 1995a) and consider weaker 
rationality hypotheses and the higher costs of negotiating and writing contracts. This 
literature relies on notions such incomplete contracts and residual rights of 
control
1
rather than agency problems. Nevertheless, the transaction cost economics 
                                                 
1 The asset owner has the residual right to decide how to use the asset in cases where the contract is silent on the 
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and new property rights literatures generally reach the same conclusions as studies of 
agency theory on the rules of governance of large publicly held companies 
(Williamson, 1988; Hart 1995b). These rules imply general mechanisms of control 
which can take various forms (board of directors, proxy fights, hostile takeovers, 
corporate financial structure), but are oriented always towards monitoring and 
disciplining management in the interests of shareholders and investors.   
 
It follows that a ‘best’ system of corporate governance that realigns managers’ 
incentives with the interests of shareholders and guarantees high cash flow and low 
costs of capital, should be diffused to and adopted by all firmson the premise of using 
resources more efficiently and stimulating further growth. Since the US model of 
corporate governance was elaborated with these objectives, it should be adopted 
across the world by US and non-US firms alike. 
 
This phenomenon is often studied in the literature in terms of the convergence of 
corporate systems and regulation (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011; Bebchuk and 
Weisbach, 2010). It should be noted that convergence can mean different things - 
from incorporation of a system of corporate governance identified as ‘superior’, to a 
gradual diffusion of rules and practices that lead to a mix of co-existing systems. In a 
paper criticizing the convergence of financial systems, Hoelzl (2006) explains why 
conventional models take no account of the institutional context: in the long run 
international competition will force firms to minimize costs. Cost minimization 
requires firms to adopt rules to raise external capital at the lowest cost. Competition is 
assumed to ensure that all corporate governance systems converge to the most 
efficient system. Countries that fail to adopt the ‘right’ system will inflict costs on 
their firms, which will be less able to raise capital, and might migrate from the 
country if inappropriate corporate rules are adopted. Because of this mechanical 
relationship between competition and governance, supporters of agency theory and 
                                                                                                                                            
occurrence of some event affecting this use.  
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related models of corporate governance argue that the shareholder value model is 
based on best practice and intrinsically is superior to other models.  
 
However, other arguments have been proposed in the field of corporate governance 
and there are different hypotheses related to corporate governance which tend to be 
supported by opposing theories. The stakeholder perspective is the main alternative to 
the maximization of shareholder value promoted by Agency theory. The stakeholder 
perspective argues that there are numerous parties that contribute to the firm’s 
economic performance and value. Consequently, all these stakeholders not just the 
suppliers of capital must be considered as residual claimants (Blair, 1995; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Kelly et al., 1997; Zingales, 2000; Hansmann, 1996; Driver and 
Thompson, 2002). Another strand in the literature proposes that the model of 
corporate governance – understood as shareholder or stakeholder value oriented – 
cannot be considered in isolation from the institutional context in which it is to be 
implemented; it claims also that this institutional context has changed significantly 
since the early 2000s. It should be remembered that, since 2000, financial markets 
have become much less stable, investors have become more short-termist, and 
because of their size and sometimes aggressive strategies, more able to impose their 
views at the board of directors level (Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005; Tylecote, 2007; 
Allen, 2005; Coffee, 2005; Becht et al., 2005; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Aoki, 
1984). Finally, some contributions in the economics of innovation show that the 
model of shareholder value may have increased the ‘ups and downs’ that innovative 
firms and innovative industries have experienced following the Internet bubble 
explosion in 2000, and conclude that adopting this model is not neutral and may even 
be detrimental to the evolution of these firms and industries (Lazonick, 2007; 
Fransman, 2004; Krafft and Ravix, 2005, 2007; Krafft et al., 2008; Driver and Guedes, 
2012; Lhuillery, 2011). These theories suggest that the adoption of the US model in 
firms is not leading to optimum results because of country-level and/or firm-level 
differences.  
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In sum, at the theoretical level, the issue of corporate governance continues to 
generate critical debate about the convergence of all forms to US best practice. 
 
2.2. Empirics: from US centred analyses to international comparisons 
 
We discuss some key references in the empirical literature according to the way they 
measure corporate governance,
2
 starting with US centred analyses and moving to 
international comparisons. It appears that,while well established that particular 
aspects of corporate governance affect firm value, the overall effect of corporate 
governance on firm value and performance is still unclear. It also appears that there is 
some evidence of a convergence with the US model, which needs to be further 
investigated however. On this basis, we draw a set of hypotheses to be tested using 
data from RiskMetrics / Institutional Shareholder Services. 
 
2.2.1. US data 
 
Investor Responsibility Research Center  
 
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publishes detailed listings of 
corporate governance provisions for individual firms in corporate takeover defences. 
Data are derived from a variety of public sources (corporate bylaws and charters, 
proxy statements, annual reports, 10K, and 10Q documents). All sample firms are 
drawn from Standard & Poor’s 500 and the annual lists of Fortune, Forbes, and 
Business Week. The IRRC reports (published in 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998)include 
several hundred firms. 
                                                 
2 We do not provide a summary of all the sources of data used in the corporate governance literature. For some 
recent attempts to provide surveys of the data available, see Ertugrul and Hedge (2009), Koehn and Ueng (2005), 
or Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009).  
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Gompers et al. (2003) provide a firm-level governance index (G-Index) based on the 
prevalence of 24 governance provisions in firms surveyed by IRRC. They add one 
point for every provision that reduces shareholder rights. They find that firms with 
higher index values, indicating poor governance, e.g. fewer shareholder rights, have 
significantly lower valuations although not necessarily lower operating performance, 
than firms with lower index values. Bebchuk et al. (2008) provide similar results 
using a governance (entrenchment) index consisting of a smaller set of 6provisions. 
Finally, Core et al. (2006), in contrast to Gompers et al. (2003), show that firms with 
weak shareholder rights exhibit systematic significant operating underperformance.  
 
2.2.2. International comparisons 
 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia  
 
The Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) report includes corporate governance 
rankings on 495 companies in 25 countries. The sample is selected based on two 
criteria: firm size and investor interest. The CLSA corporate governance 
questionnaire covers 7broad categories. The questionnaire is completed by Credit 
Lyonnais analysts in each country for the companies they cover. They add one point 
for each ‘Yes’ response; the percentage of positive responses to the questions in each 
category is reported.  
 
Klapper and Love (2004) use firm-level data for 374 firms in 14 emerging countries. 
Their main governance index is the average of the first 6 categories in the CLSA 
report. They report that better corporate governance is highly correlated with better 
operating performance and higher market valuation, which gives some support to the 
idea of convergence and non-US firms adopting US firms’ corporate governance 
practices.  
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Single-market, survey-based governance index 
 
These firm-specific corporate governance indexes are constructed based on responses 
to surveys of listed companies in a single market.  
 
Black et al. (2006b) construct a Korean Corporate Governance Index (KCGI) for 515 
Korean companies, based on a survey of corporate governance practices in all 
companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange in 2001. The authors extracted 38 
variables from the survey questions, which they classified into 4 sub-indices before 
combining the sub-indices into the overall index-KCGI. They report that a 
worst-to-best change in KCGI predicts a 0.47 increase in Tobin’s Q.  
 
Drobetz et al. (2004) document a positive relationship between governance practices 
and firm valuation in German public firms, based on a broad corporate governance 
rating related to the German Corporate Governance code. To construct their sample, 
they sent questionnaires to 253 German firms in different market segments to which 
they had a 36% response. They assume constant historical ratings since their 
corporate governance data are limited to one observation, March 2002.  
 
Beiner et al. (2006) sent out a questionnaire based on the suggestions and 
recommendations of the Swiss Code of Best Practice, to all Swiss firms quoted on the 
Swiss Stock Exchange in 2003. The index consists of 38 governance attributes across 
5 categories. They report that a one point increase in the corporate governance index 
causes an increase in market capitalization of roughly 8.52%.  
 
 
These contributions support increasing convergence in systems of corporate 
governance. However, we need more systematic results based on empirical studies of 
the following dimensions: data that explicitly consider several countries; corporate 
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governance measures that include multidimensional aspects of corporate governance; 
and longer time frames which all more generalizable results.  
 
Other critical work on international comparisons 
 
At the macro level, Allen (2005) notes that in the absence of complete markets, the 
beneficial properties of shareholder dominance do not necessarily apply and firms that 
pursue broader interests may show better performance. Also, throughout history and 
in some fast growing countries such as China, shareholder dominance is not 
necessarily accompanied by high performance. Aglietta and Rébérioux (2005) 
characterize the incongruence between shareholder dominance and economies with 
liquid markets, where investors are short termist, and financial markets are highly 
instable. Coffee (2005) complements the argument by stressing that the structure of 
ownership, highly dispersed in the Anglo-American system and more concentrated in 
the continental European one, is important for explaining the performance 
implications of corporate governance.  
 
At the micro level, Aoki (1984) noted that Japanese firms were predominantly 
characterized by an insider corporate governance model. Japanese firms are 
accountable not just to investors and managers but also to other involved parties 
(employees, banks, suppliers, customers). The argument that the firm is composed of 
numerous actors all contributing to its economic performance and value, who should 
all be rewarded adequately, is revisited in the stakeholder perspective (Blair, 1995; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Kelly et al., 1997; Mitchell et al., 1997) which claims 
that shareholders cannot be considered the sole residual claimants. Zingales (2000) 
refines this argument by defining the firm as the web of specific investments built 
around a critical resource. Grandori (2004) offers a broader conceptualization of the 
notion of the governance form that includes important elements of the organizational 
form of the enterprise at the empirical level. Hansmann (1996) shows that stock value 
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maximization may not be in the best interests of shareholders.  
 
Finally, at a meso-level, several studies analyse the impact of corporate governance 
on the development and decline of the ‘New Economy’ at the turn of the millenium. 
Fransman (2004) analysed the processes and mechanisms that played a significant 
role in causing the booms and busts in the telecoms industry. The role of financial 
excesses, largely mediated by complex interactions between investors and financial 
analysts, is identified as a determinant of the turbulence observed in industry 
dynamics, i.e. the explosion of the Internet bubble. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2002) 
and Carpenter, O’Sullivan and Lazonick (2003) show that the model of corporate 
governance adopted by US companies influenced the ways that they used their stock 
and this rendered them more vulnerable when the stock market bubble burst in 2000. 
Finally, Driver and Guedes (2012) show that greater levels of governance induced 
less R&D spending in the UK over the period 2000-2005, while Lhuillery (2011) 
shows that, in France, there is no significant influence on R&D decisions, and raises 
doubts about the Anglo-Americanization of French firms. 
 
While these critical views are gaining more visibility over time, they do not provide a 
systematic account of how US standards, in terms of governance, have progressed or 
not in non-US countries and firms in recent years. We investigate this by examining 
our research hypotheses using international data at a firm-level. 
 
Our research hypotheses 
 
The relations we want to investigate are described below. The literature so far 
identifies a global positive relationship between corporate governance and various 
measures of performance in US, and some non-US data. This leads to the formulation 
of the following hypotheses on whether there is convergence of non-US firms towards 
US practices in terms of corporate governance, and whether this generates increases 
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in performance and value:   
 
H1: Better governed firms should show higher stock market performance (Stock 
Return or Dividend Yield). 
 
H2: Better governed firms should show higher value (Tobin’s Q). 
 
H3: Better governed firms should show higher operating performance (Return on 
Assets or Net Profit Margin).  
 
3. Governance index constructions and definition of the variables 
 
In this section, we re-examine the links between corporate governance, firm value, 
and performance, using a very extensive and broad governance database. We use the 
CGQ index (Corporate Governance Quotient) from RiskMetrics / Institutional 
Shareholder Services. We focus on overall (aggregate) corporate governance ratings 
for a large range of international firms. Our sample is constructed using information 
on more than 2500 firms in 24 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (China), Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK). Our sample-firms come from 25 industries: 
Automobiles & Components, Banks, Capital Goods, Commercial Services & Supplies, 
Consumer Durables & Apparel, Consumer Services, Diversified Financials, Energy, 
Food Beverage & Tobacco, Food & Staples Retailing, Health Care Equipment & 
Services, Hotels Restaurants & Leisure, Household & Personal Products, Insurance, 
Materials, Media, Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology, Real Estate, Retailing, 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment, Software & Services, Technology 
Hardware & Equipment, Telecommunication Services, Transportation, Utilities. The 
CGQ is calculated on the basis of a rating system that incorporates 8categories of 
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corporate governance, leading to an improved qualitative measure of 55 governance 
factors. The study period covered is 2003-2008, which includes the largest number of 
reporting firms with complete and consistent data. The study time frame is also 
central because it corresponds to the post financial crash era when several major 
corporate scandals were observed, leading many investors and managers to realize 
that good governance was important and must be priced adequately.  
 
In what follows, we provide details on the construction of our corporate governance 
measure and the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
3.1. Corporate Governance Quotient 
 
Prior to being acquired by RiskMetrics in 2007, Institutional Shareholder Services 
operated independently as the world’s largest corporate governance data provider. 
Institutional Shareholder Services developed its corporate governance rating system 
to assist institutional investors to evaluate the impact that a firm’s corporate 
governance structure and practices might have on performance. The rating is aimed at 
providing objective and complete information on firm’s governance practices. 
Importantly, these ratings are not tied to any other service provided by RiskMetrics / 
Institutional Shareholder Services and firms do not pay to be rated, although they are 
invited to check the accuracy of the ratings. The only way a firm can improve its 
rating is to publicly disclose changes to its governance structure and / or practices. 
 
The CGQ is the output of a corporate governance scoring system that evaluates the 
strengths, deficiencies, and overall quality of a company’s corporate governance 
practices. It is updated daily for over 7,500 companies worldwide. The ratings are 
based on a single set of policy standards inspired by OECD principles.  
 
Each company’s CGQ rating is generated from detailed analysis of its public 
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disclosure documents (i.e. Proxy Statement, 10K, 8K, Guidelines…), press releases 
and company web site. CGQ is calculated by adding 1 point if the firm under scrutiny 
meets the minimum accepted governance standard. The score for each topic reflects a 
set of key governance variables. Most variables are evaluated on a standalone basis. 
Some variables are analysed in combination on the premise that corporate governance 
is improved by the presence of selected combinations of favourable governance 
provisions. For example, a company whose board includes a majority of independent 
directors, and independent board committees (audit, etc.) receives higher ratings for 
these attributes in combination than it would have received for each separately. Next, 
each company’s CGQ is compared with other companies in the same index (here the 
index is MSCI EAFE index).
3
 For example, Company A scores 24% (or 0.24) for its 
CGQ index, this means that Company A is performing better (outperforming) in 
relation to corporate governance practices and policies than 24% of the companies in 
the MSCI EAFE index.  
 
3.1.1. The value of multiple attributes  
 
The reason why we use multiple attributes of governance in this study is that, for a 
long time, single attribute contributions were providing often inconsistent, even 
contradictory results. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), in a seminal 
article, showed that the predominance of external members on company boards 
increased market performance, while Bhagat et al. (2004) argued that firms linked by 
long-term relationships with investors (relational investors) obtained better results. 
The emergence of systematic work with multi attributes for governance is quite recent 
and coincides with the development of databases dedicated exclusively to this issue. 
                                                 
3 This is a stock market index of foreign stocks, from the perspective of North American investors. The index is 
market capitalization weighted (meaning that the weight of securities is determined based on their respective 
market capitalizations.) The index aims to cover 85% of the market capitalization of the equity markets of all 
countries that are a part of the index. It is maintained by Morgan Stanley Capital International. EAFE is Europe, 
Australia, Asia and Far East. 
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Several databases have been developed in recent years: RiskMetrics / International 
Shareholder Services (RM / ISS), The Corporate Library (TCL), and Governance 
Metrics International (GMI). They all systematically assess the strengths, weaknesses 
and characteristics of firms’ governance practices in relation to the standard of 
maximizing shareholder value. Adoption of this standard at firm-, industry- or 
country-level is based on an index that integrates various dimensions of governance. 
These databases, therefore, collect the most comprehensive information possible on 
these different dimensions.  
 
In a recent Special Issue, Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) argued that in the field of 
corporate governance some areas (shareholder activism, corporate directors, and 
executives and their compensation) will achieve greater centrality in the future. In 
another paper, Lhuillery (2011) notes that multiple practices are difficult to consider 
simultaneously, and often are synthesized in the literature within indexes 
approximating the measure of intensity of alignment using the number of shareholder 
oriented governance practices implemented. The positive coefficient of these indexes 
suggests that the effects of shareholder oriented practices on performance are additive: 
every additional shareholder-oriented practice implemented adds a positive marginal 
benefit, whatever the combination of the adopted practices. Lhuillery’s study shows 
that two core governance practices in the shareholder model – compensation schemes 
and voting rules –have no influence however.  
 
Concerning the data we use, ISS Risk Metrics has implemented a rating system which 
considers variables in isolation and also in combination in the belief that corporate 
governance is enhanced by selected combinations. Three aspects are under scrutiny: i) 
board composition and ownership, i.e. board is controlled by independent outside 
directors and ownership by officers and directors, considered as significant; ii) board 
composition and key committee structure, i.e. board is controlled by independent 
outside directors, and board committees (audit, nominating, and compensation) are 
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composed solely of independent outsider directors; iii) proxy contest defences, i.e. no 
unequal voting rights, no classified board, no limit on the ability to call special 
meetings, and no ability to act by written consent allowed. The data provide 
sub-scores for each category, but only for Canada and the UK; therefore, we do not 
include sub-scores in the present study. 
 
3.1.2. Corporate governance variables 
 
Table 1 presents the corporate governance variables. A detailed description of 
governance standards using the eight categories (board of directors, audit committee, 
charter/bylaws, antitakeover provisions, compensation, progressive practices, 
ownership, and director education) is provided in the Appendix.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our sample is composed of 2,662 non-US firms operating in 24 countries and 25 
industries. As in the original database, CGQ refers to 55 governance factors spanning 
the 8 categories of corporate governance. Thus the data are firm-level; all our scores 
are relative (percentiles), allowing for within-country as well as cross-country 
differences (the data explicitly consider anti-takeover provisions under national (local) 
law). Table 2 presents the number of firms by country/by industry. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.2. Other Firm Variables 
 
In order to include firm-level accounting data, we merged the RiskMetrics / 
Institutional Shareholder Services database with DataStream. We use Stock Return 
and Dividend Yield to measure firms’ stock performance, Tobin’s Q to measure the 
firm’s market valuation, and Return on Assets (ROA) and Net Profit Margins (NPM) 
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as the two main measures of firm operating performance (see more detail on the 
choice of these dependent variables in paragraphs 4.2.-4.4. below). A summary of all 
the variables used in this article is contained in Table 3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Denis (2001) argues that endogeneity is an important issue in analyses of the 
relationship between governance and performances. Firms with higher market value 
and higher performance might simply be more likely to choose better governance 
structures. One way to mitigate the problem of causality is to add appropriate control 
variables to test whether the relationship between governance and firm valuation is 
caused by some omitted variables. Therefore, we include the following control 
variables in our study: size, ratio of R&D to sales, sales growth, intangible 
concentration, market to book value, and market capitalization.  
 
We use the natural log of Total Assets, denoted as Size,to measure firm size. We 
control for Sales Growth simply because firms with good growth opportunities 
usually show a higher Tobin’s Q. We control for intangible concentration because this 
can result in a higher Tobin’s Q as, generally, market values intangibles are higher 
than their book values. We use the Fixed Capital to Total Sales ratio to measure the 
relative importance of fixed capital in the firm’s output, denoted Intang in the study. 
For stock market performance, we include the natural log of market capitalization 
(LnMC) and natural log of market to book value (LnMTBV) to control for Size and 
the different investment opportunities available, and also growth opportunities. Since 
undoubtedly there are other industry-related factors that affect the valuation of firms, 
we control for these industry factors through a set of SIC industry dummy variables.  
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4. Corporate governance and firm performance 
 
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. The first explores the relationship between 
governance and the firm’s stock market performance. To investigate this relationship 
we use two measures, Stock Return and Dividend Yield. The second step explores the 
relationship between governance and firm valuation, using Tobin’s Q. The third step 
tests the relationship between governance and firm’s operating performance based on 
ROA and NPM. 
 
4.1. Summary Statistics  
 
We begin by presenting some basic summary statistics for the variables includes in 
this study.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables included in our analysis. 
CGQ ranges from 0 to 1, with mean and median 0.54 and 0.56, and standard deviation 
of 0.28. Stock Return ranges from -0.99 to 6.41, with mean and median 0.14 and 0.10, 
and standard deviation of 0.43. Dividend yield ranges from 0 to 45.98, with mean and 
median 2.41 and 1.89, and standard deviation of 2.08. Tobin’s Q ranges from 0.003 to 
8.93, with mean and median 1.05 and 0.85, and standard deviation of 0.87. ROA has 
mean and median of 0.07 and 0.06, standard deviation of 0.084, and minimum and 
maximum values of -0.79 and 0.96. NPM has mean and median of 0.17 and 0.10, 
standard deviation of 0.49, and minimum and maximum values of -7.26 and 6.74. 
 
Table 5 provides summary statistics for the variables when CGQ is split into five 
quintiles (5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95%). We observe a slight upward tendency in 
Tobin’s Q as CGQ increases; the mean of Tobin’s Q for the highest quintile is 1.19 
and 0.96 for the lowest quintile. We include Size in the table to show that this 
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tendency is not observable for this variable. We can conclude that those firms with the 
highest CGQ ratings are not necessarily the largest companies. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 6 provides the correlation among some of the main variables, with pair-wise 
correlation below the diagonal and Spearman correlation above diagonal. Significance 
levels are indicated by asterisks. The pair-wise correlation of CGQ and Tobin’s Q is 
0.0915 and their Spearman correlation is 0.1632; both are significant at the 1% level. 
The correlation between CGQ and Size is negative at -0.2658, and the Spearman 
correlation is negative at -0.0419, but not significant. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2. Governance and stock market performance 
 
The choice of Stock Return and Dividend Yield is straightforward. If corporate 
governance matters for firm performance, and this relationship is taken account of by 
the market, then the stock price should adjust quickly to any relevant change in 
governance. Dividend Yield generally is used as a measure of profitability (see 
mostof the central references in the empirical literature, Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz 
et al., 2004, that argue that dividend yield has the advantage of being directly 
observable and stationary)
4
. Therefore, we expect that firms with better governance 
                                                 
4As suggested by one referee, dividend yield could also be viewed as a proxy for management that prioritizes 
shareholder claims to profits. The relationship between dividend yields and the strength of shareholder rights is 
related to two strands of agency literature. The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) suggests that managers of 
firms with weak shareholder rights should opportunistically attempt to retain cash within the firm rather than pay it 
out to shareholders. Alternatively, the substitution hypothesis (La Porta et al., 2000) argues that to be able to raise 
external funds on attractive terms, a firm must establish a reputation for moderation in expropriating shareholders. 
One way to establish such a reputation is by paying dividends. In both approaches, the empirical prediction is a 
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will be more profitable and will pay out higher dividends. An important issue in this 
kind of analysis is endogeneity, since firms with better performance might simply be 
more likely to choose better governance structures. Black et al. (2006a,b) point to 
evidence of endogeneity in other studies of corporate governance.
5
 Here we carry out 
an endogeneity test for the CGQ index with Stock Return and Dividend Yield as 
dependent variables. The results are reported in Table 7 and suggest that endogeneity 
is an issue if the CGQ index is used to explain the observed Stock Return variance, 
but is less important if the dependent variable is Dividend Yield. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
This suggests an instrumental variable (IV) estimation to analyse the relationship 
between Stock Return and CGQ. Table 8 reports the results of the IV estimation with 
CGQ, LnMC and LnMTBV as the independent variables. It reports sample size, 
adjusted R square, coefficients, standard errors and significance levels.  
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
We find a positive relationship between our governance indicator and Stock Return, 
significant at 1%. We can now investigate the relationship between CGQ and 
Dividend Yield. Table 9 reports the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation using CGQ, LnMC, LnMTBV, industry dummies and country dummies as 
the independent variables.   
 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
                                                                                                                                            
positive association between dividend payouts and the strength of shareholder rights. In the present interpreted this 
way: the CGQ is proxying how the management is aligned in the interests of the shareholders.  
5 See, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Durnev and Kim (2005), Himmelberg et al. (1999, 2001), Bhagat and 
Black (2002), Gillan et al. (2003). 
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Again, the relationship between CGQ and Dividend Yield is positive and statistically 
significant at 1%. This can be explained as firms that have better governance show 
higher performance on the stock market, or that improving firm governance may 
result in improved stock market performance measured by Stock Return and Dividend 
Yield. A one percentage change in the governance indicator can result in an 
approximate 0.10% change in Stock Return and a 0.73% change in Dividend Yield
6
. 
 
4.3. Governance and Firm Value 
 
If good governance can improve firms’ stock returns, in the long run, this should 
translate into a higher firm valuation. Tobin's Q plays an important role as a measure 
of the firm’s value in many financial interactions.7 Defined as the ratio of the firm’s 
market value to the replacement cost of its assets, it has been employed in a number 
of governance studies. Following Gompers et al. (2003), Bebchuck et al. (2008), 
Black et al. (2006a,b), we use Tobin’s Q to measure firm value. We define our 
Tobin’s Q as in Chung and Pruitt (1994). The approximate Q is defined as follows:  
 
Approximate Q = (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA  
where MVE is the product of the firm's share price and the number of common stock 
shares outstanding, PS is the liquidation value of the firm's outstanding preferred 
stock, DEBT is the value of the firm's short term liabilities net of its short term assets 
                                                 
6 We would offer the caveat that counting the observations for CGQ (2,662 firms over 6 years) would normally 
yield around 15,000 observations. However, including other variables of performance reduces the number of 
observations due to missing data for some firms for some years.  
 
7 Future research should try to assess the effects of CGQ on other indicators proxying for firm valuation, such as 
the percentage price premium (Colombelli, 2010). Some studies show the existence of a robust econometric 
relationship between the firm’s Tobin’s Q and total factor productivity (TFP) (Antonelli and Colombelli, 2011). In 
this context, it would be interesting to investigate the effects of CGQ on the productivity performance of the 
sampled firms. 
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plus the book value of the firm's long term debt, and TA is the book value of the 
firm’s total assets.  
 
Before proceeding to our estimation, we check the extent to which endogeneity is an 
issue when Tobin’s Q is regressed against CGQ. The test is reported in Table 10, and 
suggests that CGQ is not endogenous in this framework. 
 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
The regression results are reported in Table 11.  
 
INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
We use a pooled OLS regression. We regress Tobin’s Q against CGQ, control 
variables and industry dummies. We also show the results of estimations including 
firm-level fixed effects (models 4 and 6). We progressively add control variables in 
regressions (1)-(6). The adjusted R squares are 0.1684, 0.1749, 0.1875, 0.3483, 
0.4132 and 0.3603 respectively. CGQ is highly significant in each regression. Column 
1 is a simple regression of Tobin’s Q against CGQ. It demonstrates a significant 
positive relationship with the coefficient equal to 0.2583. In Table 11 column 2, 
which includes some control variables, we see that the coefficient of CGQ remains 
fairly stable at 0.2559, while the inclusion of more control variables (column 3) leads 
to a higher coefficient, 0.4354, significant at 1%. Finally, the model with all control 
variables shows a positive and significant although slightly lower coefficient of 
0.2629. Columns (4) and (6) show the results of the regression using fixed effect 
estimators. While the relationship between CGQ and Tobins’ Q remains positive and 
significant (1% and 5% respectively), the coefficients are smaller (0.1237 and 0.1182 
respectively). 
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4.3.1. Robustness check 
 
We conducted two tests to check the robustness of our results. First, following 
Gompers et al. (2003), La Porta et al. (2002), Bebchuck et al. (2008), and others, we 
employ industry – adjusted Tobin’s Q, defined as Tobin’s Q minus the median Q of 
the corresponding industry. Accordingly, we exclude industry dummies from the 
regression. The relationship between firm value and governance does not change. 
Second, we run annual regressions. The relation remains valid and significant, but its 
intensity varies from year to year. The impact of CGQ on Tobin’s Q generally 
increases, with exceptions in 2005 and 2006. The results are shown in Table 12. 
 
INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.4. Governance and operating performances 
 
We explore the relationship between firms’ operational performance and governance. 
We use ROA and NPM as measures of performance. Consistent with the analysis 
conducted so far, we begin by investigating whether or not CGQ is endogenous in our 
empirical context. Table 13 reports the results of the tests, which suggest that CGQ is 
endogenous with respect to the ROA, but not NPM. 
 
INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE 
 
We next test the relationship between ROA and CGQ estimated using the IV 
technique. The results of the regressions are reported in Table 14. In regression 1-3, 
we regress ROA on CGQ and the industry dummies, and add control variables 
progressively - Size, Sales Growth, R&D/Sales, and Intang.  
 
INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE 
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The results show a positive and significant relationship between governance and ROA. 
The coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Firms with weaker corporate governance 
are less profitable. This relationship becomes stronger with the addition of control 
variables. 
 
In Table 15, the dependent variable is NPM, and the independent variable is CGQ; it 
also includes two control variables: Size and Market to Book Value.  
 
INSERT TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results again show a significant positive effect of CGQ, even when firm-level 
fixed effects are taken into account.  
 
Summing up the results obtained in section 4, we addressed the question of whether 
good overall corporate governance had a positive impact on firm value and 
performance, focusing on non-US firms
8
. We investigated the link between corporate 
governance and firm value and performance, using a large sample database, 
RiskMetrics / Institutional Shareholder Services, and the CGQ. Our sample covers 
2,662 firms from 24 countries and 25 industries. On stock market performances, there 
is a positive relationship between CGQ and Stock Return (2SLS, significant at 1%), 
and a positive relationship between CGQ and Dividend Yield (OLS, significant at 
1%). On firm value, there is also a positive relationship between CGQ and Tobin’s Q, 
(OLS, significant at 1%; FE, significant at 5%). On operating performance, there is a 
further positive relationship between CGQ and ROA (2SLS, significant at 1%), and a 
                                                 
8These results could be to some extent due to country concentration, above all for what concerns UK and Canada 
that are reputed being influenced by the US model of governance. A robustness check to our analysis should also 
look at the subsample of Japanese firms, as Japan is alternatively considered as having its own model of 
governance. The results of such estimations are provided in Appendix B, in which it can be observed that CGQ 
either shows a positive and significant effect or is not significant.  
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positive relationship between CGQ and NPM (OLS, significant at 10%; FE, 
significant at 5%).We thus report several important findings supporting the idea that 
convergence towards US firms practice in terms of corporate governance operates and 
generates higher performance. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The aim of this paper was to revisit the link between corporate governance, value and 
performance of firms by focusing on convergence, understood as the way in which 
non-US firms are adopting the US best practice, and its implications.  
 
We investigated theoretical questions, where conventional models (agency theory, 
transaction cost economics and the new property rights theory) tend to suggest 
rational adoption of best practice while some recent contributions point to country- 
and firm-level differences that might disturb convergence. We can conclude that, at a 
theoretical level, the issue remains unresolved and critical debate continues on the 
emergence of US best practice to which all other systems (and the firms composing 
these systems) should converge, including the possibility that there is simply no 
overall ‘best’ system. In our view, the question of convergence must take account of 
country-level and firm-level differences in order to advance the theory.  
 
On an empirical level, several contributions show that firms are increasingly adopting 
US firms’ best practice related to corporate governance. We have identified some 
problems related to these contributions and suggested the need for more robust and 
sound econometric analyses to derive new results on corporate governance, value, and 
firm performance. Existing studies do not explicitly consider non-US firms in several 
countries, and consider short periods of time. We contribute to the empirical literature 
by using a large international database and showing that non-US firms are 
increasingly adopting US best practice, which is having a positive impact on their 
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performance. These results confirm the results in the literature, but use more complete 
firm-level data in relation to corporate governance components and country coverage. 
We add to the result in Gompers et al. (2003) by considering external and internal 
mechanisms of governance in non-US firms. We add also to Bebchuk et al. (2008), 
Black et al. (2006a,b), Drobetz et al. (2004), and Beiner et al. (2006) by calculating 
the impact of an index of governance on a large sample of international firms and on 
the basis of a wide range of provisions. Finally, compared to Klapper and Love (2004), 
our study period is six years study which allows a more objective and complete 
evaluation of changes in firms’ corporate governance best practice. However, we 
acknowledge that a more detailed comparison between the results in the literature and 
the ones in this study cannot go much beyond this, as the data and the estimation 
techniques used in these different studies are not the same.  
 
We can conclude that convergence holds at the empirical level. However, this should 
not be considered as putting an end to discussion of corporate governance for the 
following reasons.  
 
First, more theoretical work is required. The idea of a best model is a priori 
incompatible with the inclusion of country or firm differences. If this holds true, then 
the analysis should be oriented towards a more systematic assessment of the role of 
corporate governance in preserving firm or country differences, especially when these 
characteristics are at the basis of the drivers of growth. This suggests that there should 
be different models of corporate governance that can co-exist or be combined. An 
immediate result would be that firms and countries would not be evaluated according 
to a single reference framework, but rather on the basis of distinctive patterns of 
analysis. This option would stimulate empirical research since each pattern of analysis 
could be elaborated to generate attributes and scores of governance to account for the 
variety of situations observed at the firm- and country-levels. Ultimately, this would 
refine the results obtained so far which are necessarily highly contingent on the 
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US-centric nature of the datasets used (in the present paper also), and do not account 
fully for non-US specificities. This will be a long term research agenda. 
 
Shorter term research should be developed at the empirical level to increase our 
understanding of the impact of the adoption of the US best practice and how it 
operates at firm-level, and especially in non-US firms. The natural progression in the 
literature on international comparisons would be to try to investigate firm-level 
differences in more detail. Aggarwal et al. (2010) contribute by comparing 
governance of non-US and comparable US firms to define a ‘governance gap’. For the 
typical non-US firm, the governance gap is negative in that the firm’s governance is 
worse than the governance of its matched US firm. Aggarwal et al. find that the 
relation between firm value and the governance gap is quite important when 
comparing firms with similar characteristics. Considering firm-level indexes of 
corporate governance, non-US firms, on average, have worse governance than 
comparable US firms. They find also that non-US firms gain more from better 
governance than their matched US firms, than they lose from having worse 
governance. We think there may be some important differences to be investigated also 
within the population of non-US firms: it is still not so clear that UK firms have better 
governance and performance than their matched German or French firms, or vice 
versae. In a way, this emerging line of research is trying to solve the basic concern 
with comparative studies: apples should not be compared with oranges, only apples to 
apples comparisons make sense.  
 
Another important, related aspect on the empirical research agenda is whether 
standard corporate governance should continue to be diffused among the firms in both 
US and non-US countries, which requires more research. Our study shows that 
changes in the standard deviation of CGQ produces important changes in Tobin’s Q, 
NPM and ROA at firm-level. Our regression results and robustness checks suggest 
also, that between 2005 and 2008, the influence of CGQ on Tobin’s Q became more 
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important. This suggests that corporate governance can promote value and firm 
performance while simultaneously making them more dependent on changes in CGQ. 
The adoption of US best practice in non-US firms potentially promotes increased 
volatility in value and firm performance over time. We think these aspects should be 
investigated by thorough econometric analysis in a near future. 
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Table 2 Number of firms by country and by industry 
Country No. Firms Industry No. Firms 
Australia 141 Automobile & Components 63 
Austria 25 Banks 153 
Belgium 31 Capital Goods 284 
Canada 240 Commercial Services & Supplies 95 
Denmark 28 Consumer Durables & Apparel 120 
Finland 34 Consumer Services 73 
France 104 Diversified Finance 122 
Germany 103 Energy 90 
Greece 51 Food Beverage & Tobacco 121 
Hong Kong 113 Food & Staples Retailing 48 
Ireland  20 Health Care Equipment & Services 63 
Italy 89 Hotel Restaurants & Leisure 61 
Japan 638 Household & Personal Products 19 
Luxembourg 6 Insurance 76 
Netherlands 58 Material 266 
New Zealand 23 Media 123 
Norway 27 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 79 
Portugal 15 Real Estate 113 
Singapore 73 Retailing 108 
South Korea  14 Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 33 
Spain 68 Software & Services 117 
Sweden 55 Technology Hardware & Equipment 128 
Switzerland 73 Telecommunication Services 72 
United Kingdom 594 Transportation 122 
  Utilities 74 
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Table 3 Summaries of Firm-Level Performance Variables 
Variables Description 
Stock Return Average Annual Return 
Dividend Yield Dividend Per Share as a Percentage of the Share Price 
Tobin’s Q Market value of equity plus total liabilities divided by Total Assets 
ROA Return on Asset is the ratio of Income on Book Value of Total Asset 
NPM Net Profit Margin is the ratio of Income on Sales 
Size Logarithm of Total Assets 
R&D/Sales Ratio of [Research and Development] on Sales  
Sales Growth Average growth rate of Sales 
Intang 
Firm's intangible concentration estimated as [Property Plant and 
Equipment] on Sales 
MTBV 
Ratio of [Market Value of the Ordinary(Common) Equity] on [Book Value 
of Ordinary(Common) Equity] 
Market Capitalization [number of shares] * [share price] 
 
 
Table 4 Summary Statistics of Variables 
  Mean Sd. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
CGQ 0.54 0.28 0 0.30 0.56 0.79 1.00 
Stock Return 0.14 0.43 -0.99 -0.09 0.10 0.32 6.41 
Dividend Yield 2.41 2.08 0.00 1.1 1.89 3.2 45.98 
Tobin's Q 1.05 0.87 0.003 0.58 0.85 1.24 8.93 
ROA 0.07 0.084 -0.79 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.96 
NPM 0.17 0.49 -7.26 0.05 0.10 0.21 6.74 
Size 16.45 2.74 0 14.40 16.15 18.66 23.91 
R&D/Sales 0.06 0.23 0 0.01 0.02 0.05 4.53 
Sales Growth 1.08 0.26 -0.29 0.98 1.04 1.12 4.52 
Intang 0.91 2.42 0.00 0.16 0.31 0.61 25.50 
Ln(MTBV) 0.63 0.88 -2.81 0.15 0.55 0.99 14.67 
Ln(MarketCapitalization) 0.63 1.65 -0.59 13.55 14.54 15.58 19.81 
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Table 5 Summary Statistics of Variables of CGQ in five Quintiles 
 CGQ 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
 No. Firms 2665 2659 2662 2662 2662 
CGQ 
Mean/Median 0.13/0.13 0.32/0.31 0.50/0.50 0.70/0.70 0.90/0.89 
SD. 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Stock 
Return 
Mean/Median  
SD. 
0.12/0.07 
0.41 
0.17/0.09 
0.45 
0.18/0.13 
0.41 
0.14/0.12 
0.40 
0.11/0.08 
0.46 
Tobin's Q 
Mean/Median 0.96/0.81 0.97/0.81 1.06/0.83 1.14/0.9 1.19/0.98 
SD. 0.76 0.79 0.91 0.98 0.92 
ROA 
Mean/Median 0.07/0.06 0.06/0.06 0.07/0.06 0.07/0.07 0.07/0.08 
SD. 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11 
NPM 
Mean/Median 0.19/0.10 0.14/0.09 0.17/0.11 0.19/0.12 0.15/0.13 
SD. 0.42 0.43 0.51 0.42 0.51 
Size 
Mean/Median 16.94/17.02 17.56/18.33 16.40/16.29 15.76/15.59 15.03/14.98 
SD. 2.93 2.82 2.70 2.32 1.81 
 
 
 
Table 6 Correlations of selected variables 
 CGQ Tobin’s Q Size R&D/Sales Sales Growth 
CGQ 1.0000 0.1632
***  -0.0419  0.0624***  -0.0467** 
Tobin's Q 0.0915
***
 1.0000  -0.3758
***  0.1800***  0.1855***  
Size -0.2658
***
 -0.0708
***
 1.0000  -0.0298
**
 0.1012
***  
R&D/Sales 0.0881
***
 0.1154
***
 -0.1874
***
 1.0000  0.0360
**
 
Sales Growth 0.0044 0.0642
***
 -0.0091 0.1516
***
 1.0000  
This table provides the pair-wise correlation (below diagonal) and Spearman (above 
diagonal) correlations of Tobin’s Q, CGQ, and control variables. The definition of all the 
variables can be found in Section 3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% two-tailed levels. 
 
 
 
39 
 
Table 7 – Endogeneity test of CGQ (Stock Market Performance) 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors 
(dependent variable Stock return)                              
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors 
(dependent variable Dividend Yield)                              
 Chi-sq(1) 63.492 
(0.000) 
Chi-sq(1) 0.113 
(0.736) 
Wu-Hausman F test: 59.917 
(0.000) 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.129 
(0.719) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 59.820 
(0.000) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.131 
(.718) 
H0: the CGQ variable is exogenous. H0 rejected 
at 1% by all of the three tests: the regressor is 
endogeneous. 
 
H0: the CGQ variable is exogenous. We cannot 
reject H0: the regressor is treated as exogenous. 
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Table 8 Stock Market Performances (IV estimation) 
  Stock Return  
CGQ 0.101*** 
(3.00) 
LnMC 0.028*** 
7.67 
LnMTBV 0.128*** 
(11.71) 
Country Dummies Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes 
Sample Size 5482 
Centered R
2 
0.1156 
Uncentered R
2
 0.2679 
Hansen J statistic 
 
0.004 
(0.9516) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 
 
1419.12 
(0.000) 
This table shows results of instrumental variables estimation 
(2SLS) of the determinants of firm-level market valuation and 
governance. The dependent variables is Stock Return. CGQ is 
the governance indicator. LnMC is the natural log of Market 
Capitalization. LnMTBV is the natural log of market to book 
value. The definition of these variables can be found in section 
3. Firm-level data is from 2003-2008. Z-values based on 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. Instruments are CGQt-1, CGQt-2, 
LnMC, LnMTBV, Country Dummies, Industry Dummies. 
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Table 9 Dividend Yield (OLS estimation) 
  Dividend Yield  
CGQ 0.735*** 
(3.34) 
LnMC -0.273*** 
(-7.51) 
LnMTBV -0.360*** 
(-4.71) 
Country Dummies Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes 
Sample Size 7289 
Adjusted R2 0.0878 
This table shows results of pooled OLS estimation of the determinants of firm-level 
market valuation and governance. The dependent variable is Dividend Yield. CGQ is 
the governance indicator. LnMC is the natural log of market capitalization. LnMTBV 
is the natural log of market to book value. The definition of these variables is provided 
in Section 3. Firm-level data are for 2003-2008. T-values based on firm-clustered 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 10 – Endogeneity test of CGQ (Market Value) 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors 
(dependent variable Tobin’s Q)                              
Chi-sq(1) 0.113 
(0.736) 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.129 
(0.719) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.131 
(.718) 
H0: the CGQ variable is exogenous. We cannot 
reject H0: the regressor is treated as exogenous. 
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Table 11 Firm Valuations 
  
Tobin's Q 
 OLS OLS OLS FE OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CGQ 0.2583
*** 
0.2559
*** 
0.4354
*** 
0.1237
**
 0.2629
***
 0.1182
**
 
(4.43) (4.35) (4.44) (2.31) (3.26) (2.30) 
Size  0.0084
 
0.0114 0.5751
***
 -0.0084
**
 0.5436
***
 
 (1.32) (1.23) (18.19) (-1.09) (17.40) 
Sales Growth  0.2358
*** 
0.3988
*** 
-0.0893
*
 0.1131 -0.1197
**
 
 (5.11) (3.87) (-1.80) (1.37) (-2.23) 
R&D/Sales   -0.0521 0.0037 0.5537 -0.2455 
  (-0.29) (0.10) (1.39) (-1.52) 
Intang   0.0365 -0.0092 0.0541 0.0407 
  (0.84) (-0.20) (1.44) (0.76) 
ROA     5.2736
***
 1.3876
***
 
    (8.08) (3.08) 
NPM     -0.0512 -0.398
**
 
    (-0.22) (-2.45) 
Industry 
Dummy 
4 digit 4 digit 4 digit No 4 digit No 
Adjusted R
2 
0.1684 0.1749 0.1875 0.3483 0.4132 0.3603 
Sample Size 8487 8363 4252 4252 4205 4205 
 
This table shows results of pooled OLS estimation of the determinants of firm-level 
market valuation and governance. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which is defined 
as market value of equity plus total liabilities divided by total assets. CGQ is the 
governance indicator. Size is the natural log of total assets. Sales growth is the annual 
average growth rate of sales. R&D/Sales is the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. 
Intang is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total sales. ROA is Return on 
Assets. NPM is Net Profit Margin. Definitions of these two variables are provided in 
Section 3. Firm-level data are for 2003-2008. T-values based on firm-clustered standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
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Table 12 Robustness Check 
  
Industry 
adjustedQ 
Tobin's Q 
   2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CGQ 0.2123
***
 0.3105
***
 0.3233
***
 0.1750
**
 0.1940
**
 0.3418
***
 0.4878
***
 
(4.91) (3.62) (4.16) (2.55) (2.52) (4.32) (5.83) 
Size -0.0147
***
 -0.0316
***
 -0.0019 -0.0260
***
 0.0028 0.0155
**
 0.0501
***
 
(-3.54) (-3.70) (-0.28) (-4.15) (0.39) (2.05) (5.68) 
Sales Growth 0.1053
**
 0.1852
*
 0.7156
***
 0.2204
**
 0.0806 0.2725
***
 0.1166 
(1.96) (1.79) (3.45) (2.43) (0.96) (2.76) (1.23) 
R&D /Sales 0.7259
***
 1.0052
***
 0.8711
***
 0.3934
***
 0.3463
***
 0.5804
***
 -0.5205
**
 
(8.83) (3.98) (4.74) (2.66) (2.69) (2.94) (-2.52) 
Intang -0.0248
***
 0.0718 0.0879
**
 0.0652
**
 0.1041
***
 0.0962
**
 0.1311
***
 
(-1.42) (1.35) (2.18) (1.97) (2.58) (2.45) (2.66) 
ROA 5.1773
***
 2.4099
***
 3.7323
***
 4.3578
***
 3.8347
***
 3.9887
***
 4.4584
***
 
(31.41) (6.88) (10.42) (13.88) (13.94) (14.93) (12.01) 
NPM 0.0427 0.4824
**
 -0.1981 -0.1979 0.1331 0.2368
*
 -0.1900 
(0.62) (2.22) (-1.18) (-1.41) (1.36) (1.88) (-1.15) 
Industry 
Dummy 
No 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 
Adjusted R
2 
0.2963 0.3582 0.4078 0.4879 0.4317 0.4806 0.5036 
Sample Size 4205 702 703 717 714 706 702 
This table shows results of cross section regression by year. The first column is the result 
of the robustness check using Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q, which is defined as Tobin’s Q 
minus the median Q of the corresponding industry. In all the rest of the table, the 
dependent variable is Tobin’s Q which is defined as market value of equity plus total 
liabilities divided by total assets. CGQ is the governance indicator. Size is the natural log 
of total assets. Sales growth is annual average growth rate of sales. R&D/Sales is the 
ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. Intang is the ratio of property, plant and 
equipment tototal sales. ROA is Return on Assets. NPM is Net Profit Margin. The 
definitions of these two variables are provided in Section 3.Firm-level data are for 
2003-2008. T-values are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level 
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at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Table 13 – Endogeneity test of CGQ (Operating Performances) 
Test of endogenous regressors 
(dependent variable ROA, tested regressor CGQ)                              
Test of endogenous regressors 
(dependent variable NPM, tested regressor CGQ)                              
Chi-sq(1) 6.189 
(0.0129) 
Chi-sq(1) 0.195 
(0.6586) 
Wu-Hausman F test: 6.5818 
(0.0104) 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.210 
(0.647) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 6.6346 
(0.0100) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.211 
(0.646) 
H0: the CGQ variable is exogenous. H0 rejected 
at 5% and 1% by the three tests: the regressor is 
endogeneous. 
H0: the CGQ variable is exogenous. H0 cannot be 
rejected: the regressor is treated as exogeneous. 
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Table 14 Operating Performances (IV estimation) 
ROA 
  (1) (2) (3) 
CGQ 0.0122
***
 0.0285
***
 0.0502
***
 
(2.59) (8.68) (6.70) 
Size  0.004
***
 0.005
***
 
 (8.90) (7.21) 
Sales Growth  0.0266
***
 0.0549
***
 
 (4.56) (4.99) 
R&D/Sales   -0.1333
***
 
  (-6.34) 
Intang   -0.0018 
  (-0.62) 
Industry dummy 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 
Sample Size 8467 8328 4230 
Centered R
2 
0.0854 0.1157 0.2024 
Uncentered R
2
 0.4944 0.5126 0.6019 
Hansen J statistic 
 
0.063 
(0.802) 
1.155 
(0.2825) 
0.077 
(0.7812) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 
 
2465.70 
(0.000) 
2058.64 
(0.000) 
917.79 
(0.000) 
This table shows results of instrumental variables estimation (2SLS) of 
the determinants of firm-level operating performance and governance. 
The dependent variable is ROA. CGQ is the governance indicator. Size 
is the natural log of total assets. Sales growth is the annual average 
growth rate of sales. R&D/Sales is the ratio of R&D expenditure to total 
sales. Intang is the ratio of property, plant and equipment tototal sales. 
LnMTBV is the natural log of market to book value defined as market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Firm-level data are 
for 2003-2008. Z-values based on heteroskedastic robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Instruments are CGQt-1, CGQt-2, Size, 
Sales Growth, R&D/Sales, Intang, and industry dummies. 
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Table 15 Operating Performances (OLS and FE) 
NPM 
  
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
CGQ 0.291
***
 0.0654
*
 0.1014** 
(4.51) (1.00) (1.98) 
Size  -0.0256
***
 0.5881*** 
 (-3.23) (22.7) 
LnMTBV  0.3991
***
 -.0027 
 (13.42) (-0.09) 
Industry dummy 4-digit 4-digit No 
Adjusted R
2 
0.2811 0.3378 0.182 
Sample Size 7783 7535 7535 
This table shows results of pooled OLS and Fixed Effects estimation of 
the determinants of firm-level market valuation and governance. The 
dependent variable is (Here, the NPM is in its logarithm form). CGQ is 
the governance indicator. Size is the natural log of Total Assets. 
LnMTBV is the natural log of market to book value defined as market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Firm-level data is 
from 2003-2008. T-values based on firm-clustered standard errors are 
showed in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
47 
 
Appendix A 
 
  Governance Measures Governance Standards 
Board Structure 
Board Composition At least 2/3 of the directors on the board should be independent 
Nominating Committee This committee of the board should be composed solely of independent directors 
Compensation Committee This committee of the board should be composed solely of independent directors 
Governance Committee 
The functions of a governance committee should be handled by a committee of 
the board, typically the nominating committee or the governance committee 
Board Structure Directors should be accountable to shareholders on an annual basis 
Board Size 
Generally, boards should not have fewer than 6 members or more than 15 
members. A board of between 9 and 12 board members is considered ideal. 
Changes in Board Size 
Shareholders should have the right to vote on changes to expand or contract the 
size of the board 
Cumulative Voting Shareholders should have the right to cumulate their votes for directors 
Boards Served On-CEO 
In addition to serving on his own company's board, the CEO should not serve on 
more than two other boards of public companies 
Boards Served on -Other than CEO 
Outside directorships should be limited to service on the boards of five or fewer 
public companies. A service limit of four or fewer public company boards is 
considered even better  
Former CEO's Former CEOs should not serve on the board of directors 
Chairman/CEOs Separation 
The positions of chairman and CEO should be separated or a lead director should 
be specified 
Board Guidelines Board Guidelines should be published in the proxy on an annual basis 
Response To Shareholder Proposals 
Management should take action on all shareholder proposals supported by a 
majority vote within 12 months of the shareholders' meeting 
Boards Attendance Directors should attend at least 75% of board meetings 
Board Vacancies 
Shareholders should be given an opportunity to vote on all directors selected to 
fill vacancies. In cases where the company has a classified board, a director filing 
a vacancy should stand for election along with the class of directors to be voted 
on at the next meeting of shareholders 
Related Party Transactions 
CEO's should not be the subject of transactions that create conflicts of interest as 
disclosed in the proxy statement 
Audit 
Audit Committee This committee of the board should be composed solely of independent directors 
Audit Fees Consulting fees (audit-related and other)should be less than audit fees 
Auditor Rotation The company should disclose its policy with respect to the rotation of auditors 
Auditor Ratification 
Shareholders should be permitted to ratify management's selection of auditors 
each year 
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Charter/Bylaws 
Features of Poison Pills 
Shareholders should be permitted to approval shareholder rights plans (i.e. poison 
pills). Plans with the following features are considered shareholder friendly: 3 
year independent director evaluation, sunset provision, qualified offer clause, and 
a trigger threshold of 20% or more 
Vote Requirements 
A simple majority vote should be required to amend the charter/bylaws and to 
approve mergers or business combinations 
Written Consent Shareholders should be permitted to act by written consent 
Special Meetings Shareholders should be permitted to call special meetings 
Board Amendments 
Management should not be permitted to amend the bylaws without shareholder 
approval 
Capital Structure 
Common stock entitled to one vote per share and declawed preferred stock are 
viewed favorably 
Anti-Takeover 
Provisions 
Anti-Takeover Provisions Applicable 
Incorporation in a state without anti-takeover provisions, or opting out of such 
protections is viewed favorably 
Under Country(local)Laws 
Incorporation in a state without anti-takeover provisions, or opting out of such 
protections is viewed favorably 
Executive and 
Director 
Compensation 
Cost of Option Plans 
An option-pricing model is used to measure the cost of all stock-based incentive 
plans. The cost is compared to an allowable cap that is based upon 
company-specific factors including industry, market capitalization, performance, 
and levels of cash compensation. The estimated plan cost is compared to the 
allowable cap. 
Option Re-Pricing 
Shareholder approval should be sought prior to re-pricing underwater stock 
options. Plan documents should be written to expressively prohibit re-pricing 
without prior shareholder approval. 
Shareholder Approval of Option Plans All stock-based incentive plans should be submitted to shareholders for approval 
Compensation Committee Interlocks No interlocking directors should serve on the Compensation Committee 
Director Compensation Director should receive a portion of their compensation in the form of stock 
Pension Plans for Non-Employee 
Directors 
Non-Employee directors should not participate in pension plans 
Director Option Expensing Companies are moving toward option expensing 
Option Burn Rate 
Burn rates are considered excessive where average annual option grants exceed 
3% of outstanding shares over the past three years 
Corporate Loans 
New loan programs under stock option plans are now prohibited. Plans containing 
these provisions are flagged for this negative plan feature 
Progressive 
Practices 
Retirement Age for Directors 
A retirement age or term limits serve as useful tools for ensuring that new board 
talent is regularly sought 
Board Performance Reviews A policy of conducting regular board performance reviews should be disclosed 
Meetings of Outside Directors 
A policy specifying that directors should meet without the CEO should be 
disclosed 
CEO Succession Plan A board-approved CEO succession plan should be in place and evaluated by the 
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directors periodically 
Outside Advisors Available to Board A policy authorizing the board to hire its own advisors should be disclosed 
Directors Resign upon Job Change 
A policy requiring directors to resign upon a change in job status should be 
disclosed 
Ownership 
Director Ownership Each director owns stock in the company 
Executive Stock Ownership 
Guidelines 
Executives and directors should be subject to stock ownership guidelines 
Officer and Director Stock Ownership 
Officers and directors should have a significant ownership position in their 
company's stock 
Director 
Education 
Director Education 
All board members should participate in "ISS accredited" director education 
programs 
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Appendix B – Results of Econometric Estimations, Japanese Firms 
 
 Stock Market Performance  Firm Value  Operating Performance 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Stock Return 
IV(b) 
Div Yield 
OLS 
 Tobin’s Q 
OLS(a) 
Tobin’s Q 
OLS(a) 
Tobin’s Q 
OLS(a) 
Tobin’s Q  
FE(a) 
 NPM 
(OLS) 
NPM 
(FE) 
ROA 
IV(c) 
ROA 
IV 
             
CGQ 0.938*** -0.196***  0.202** 0.206* 0.246** 0.298***  -0.136 0.0590 -0.00347 0.00283 
 (0.0946) (0.0720)  (0.0953) (0.123) (0.102) (0.0725)  (0.0887) (0.0722) (0.0134) (0.0139) 
lnMC 0.0206** -0.103***           
 (0.00922) (0.0122)           
lnMTBV 0.244*** -0.371***       0.509*** -0.112**   
 (0.0298) (0.0277)       (0.0321) (0.0534)   
Size    0.144*** 0.148*** 0.0772*** 0.501***  0.112*** 0.740*** 0.0124*** 0.0125*** 
    (0.0176) (0.0218) (0.0141) (0.0327)  (0.0143) (0.0407) (0.00113) (0.00126) 
Sales Growth    0.450*** 0.633*** 0.186** -0.0444    0.0644*** 0.0885*** 
    (0.110) (0.157) (0.0940) (0.0477)    (0.0121) (0.0197) 
R&D/Sales     1.461* 0.939 -0.893     0.00977 
     (0.788) (0.729) (0.550)     (0.0622) 
Intang     0.0492 0.0274 0.0171     -0.0116*** 
     (0.0631) (0.0624) (0.0989)     (0.00425) 
ROA      3.504*** -0.590      
      (0.963) (0.549)      
NPM      1.236** 0.795*      
      (0.602) (0.410)      
Constant -0.607*** 3.787***  -2.559*** -3.015*** -0.959*** -8.965***  -4.799*** -17.09*** -0.277*** -0.283*** 
 (0.191) (0.300)  (0.465) (0.476) (0.266) (0.668)  (0.356) (0.786) (0.0273) (0.0347) 
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Observations 1,820 2,600  2,735 2,083 2,073 2,073  2,568 2,568 1,832 1,395 
R-squared 0.093 0.310  0.343 0.308 0.506 0.462  0.422 0.244 0.306 0.284 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  (a) Firm-clustered standard errors 
  (b) Instruments are CGQt-1, CGQt-2, LnMC, LnMTBV, Country Dummies, Industry Dummies. 
(c) Instruments are CGQt-1, CGQt-2, Size, Sales Growth, R&D/Sales, Intang, and industry dummies. 
 
